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Abstract
It is argued that the Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Mechan-
ics, founded ontologically on the concept of probability, may be ques-
tionable in view of the fact that within Probability Theory itself the
ontological status of the concept of probability has always been, and
is still under discussion.
1. Two Issues in Probability Theory
Two long unresolved - and in fact, seldom considered - issues have
for more than two centuries by now accompanied modern Probability
Theory.
The first one we shall only mention as an example of how fundamental
aspects can be - and in fact, are - overlooked. The second one, which
has not been completely overlooked, has nevertheless found itself side
lined for longer, even if it has obvious major implications in Quantum
Foundations.
As for the more general background on the various, and often severely
conflicting views and interpretation of the basic concepts or methods
of Probability Theory, a recent survey can be found in [1].
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One of the two issues mentioned above, namely, the issue of redundan-
cies, [2], seems not to have been the object of any wider awareness,
although it has led to considerable technical difficulties in, among
others, stochastic processes with continuous time. And as it happens,
this issue has not been overcome even by the nonstandard approach
to probabilities, specifically, by the introduction of Loeb measures and
integration.
The second issue, which is known at least in principle, seems nev-
ertheless similarly to be outside of the realms of general awareness,
and certainly, of a more active pursuit in its possible implications in
a large variety of applications of Probability Theory. This issue con-
cerns whether the axioms of Probability Theory, as given for instance
in their formulation due to Kolmogorov, happen to have a deeper sta-
tus than mere epistemic convenience.
2. Deterministic, versus Non-Deterministic Phenomena
Classical Physics, as well as Special and General Relativity, typically
deal with deterministic phenomena, such as for instance those related
to gravitation, electro-magnetism, and so on.
What is important to note here is that, usually in such situations,
the classification ”deterministic” is not merely an epistemic choice of
convenience, but it is rather seen as an essential ontological feature of
the respective phenomena.
On the other hand, and not only in the realms of Physics, there are
phenomena which obviously cannot be considered deterministic, be it
from an ontological, or for that matter, epistemic point of view.
In this regard, until the 1960s, there has been one single subclass
of non-deterministic phenomena specifically identified and studied as
such, namely, the subclass composed of those phenomena which were
considered to be probabilistic. And clearly, even if not always explicitly
expressed, the subclass of probabilistic phenomena was not - and in
fact, could not be - identified with the whole class of non-deterministic
ones.
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However, since the work of Zadeh in the 1960s, a second subclass of
non-deterministic phenomena, namely, those called fuzzy, has been
pointed out, even if not in as clear and rigorous mathematical formu-
lation as that of the probabilistic ones. And needless to say, there
is no claim that these two classes, namely, the probabilistic and the
fuzzy one, may have a significant overlap. Similarly, there is no - and
there could not possibly be - any claim that these two classes exhaust
all the non-deterministic phenomena.
Not much later, in the 1970s, with the work of Feigenbaum, a fur-
ther subclass of phenomena, namely, the chaotic ones got singled out.
Here however, a somewhat surprising turn of events happened, as
the chaotic phenomena studied ever since have typically been those
that may be seen as ”deterministic chaos”, that is, chaotic phenom-
ena produced - rather surprisingly - by certain deterministic nonlinear
systems.
3. Ontological, or merely Epistemic ?
Being here mostly interested in the issue of the ontological, or on the
contrary, merely epistemic status of modern Probability Theory, we
shall only consider the following division in classes of phenomena :
• deterministic
• non-deterministic
– probabilistic
– fuzzy
– the rest
Several remarkable facts, seldom, if at all of a wider concern, are worth
mentioning about these classes.
First perhaps is the fact that the class of non-deterministic phenom-
ena is simply defined by a mere negation. And as it is a well known
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elementary fact of Logic, such a definition by negation is hardly ap-
propriate, since it opens up all the possibilities other than specified
by the negated one, [4-6]. This is therefore a possible major source of
the difficulties which may lurk at the bottom of all subsequent deal-
ings with the resulting concept of non-deterministic phenomena. In
particular, this definition by mere negation may negatively affect the
attempts to set up definitions for the subclasses of probabilistic, fuzzy
or chaotic phenomena, not to mention other possible non-deterministic
subclasses.
And one of such important negative effects may be in the fact that,
although we tend to see the concept of ”deterministic” as having an
essentially ontological status, the definition by a mere negation of the
concept of ”non-deterministic” may seriously weaken any hope for a
similar status of that concept, and consequently, of its particular cases
of concepts, such as ”probabilistic”, ”fuzzy” ”chaotic”, and so on.
Focusing now on the concept of ”probabilistic”, it should be recalled
that, back in the 1930s, soon after the setting up of the Kolmogorov
model, De Finetti pointed out that, within such a model there are
most serious issues as to the ontological status of the concept of prob-
ability. And in a somewhat shocking and provocative manner, De
Finetti stated, [3], that ”probability does not exist!” ...
As it happens, such a view is but a part of a larger trend or school
of thought, called usually Subjective Probability, [1], a trend which in-
corporates the much older Bayesian subjectivity which is still in use
in certain circles, as well as a number of other ones. And the main
claim of that view is that the concept of probability is lacking any on-
tological status, being instead a mere epistemic choice of convenience,
therefore subjective as such.
Needless to say, in the case of the fuzzy subclass of non-deterministic
phenomena, the ontological status of that concept appears to have
even a lesser likelihood than that of the concept of probability.
4. Should Quanta Be Founded on Ontologically Uncertain
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Probabilities ?
Starting with the mid 1920s, when the modern version of Quantum
Mechanics replaced the original one introduced in 1900 by Planck,
and developed by Einstein, Bohr and a few others, it appeared to
be a matter of a significant pride to Bohr, Heisenberg and Born to
have originated such a totally unprecedented new theory of Physics,
one which in its rather incredibly counterintuitive novelty went far
beyond even of Einstein’s General Relativity. And in the view of their
originators, a view which was to become the so called Copenhagen In-
terpretation, a major, if not in fact, by far the most major novelty was
what they considered to be the inevitable and irreducible involvement
of randomness or probability in quantum phenomena.
This position of the founders of modern Quantum Mechanics was pre-
cisely that which created the extreme separation between them, and
on the other hand, a few others, among them at the time Einstein,
Schro¨dinger, De Broglie, and later, Bohm and Bell. In this regard, the
often cited maxim of Einstein that ”God does not play dice” expresses
quite clearly the total opposition between the respective two views.
In other words, the founders of modern Quantum Mechanics postu-
lated nothing short of an ontological status for probabilities in quan-
tum phenomena. On the other hand, Einstein and others were only
willing to accept for probabilities a mere epistemic status. In par-
ticular, in Einstein’s view, the wave function, and the corresponding
probability amplitude, were only describing an ensemble of quantum
particles prepared in the same way, and by no means one single indi-
vidual such particle. Thus Einstein’s view that Quantum Mechanics,
as advocated by the Copenhagen Interpretation, had to be incomplete,
a view famously presented in the 1935 celebrated EPR paper.
But now, with hindsight, the following issue arises :
• QuantumMechanics, in its Copenhagen Interpretation, is founded
on the ontological status played in that theory by the concept
of probability. On the other hand, that ontological status of the
concept of probability has for long been questioned in Probabil-
ity Theory. Therefore, should, or for that matter, can Quantum
Mechanics have an ontology which insists on probabilities ?
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The fact that the founders of modern Quantum Mechanics did not
seem to consider the above issue is easy to explain. As most of those
who apply Probability Theory, they were not much concerned with
the inner affairs of that theory. Not to mention that the work of De
Finetti only started to appear a decade later, in the 1930s.
What may, however, be less easy to explain is why even today no con-
cern is shown related to the mentioned possibly ill-founded ontology
of Quantum Mechanics in its Copenhagen Interpretation.
5. Infinity Again Causes Trouble ...
One of the basic problems - even if hardly at all known within wider
circles of mathematicians or physicists - which keep troubling Proba-
bility Theory is the inevitable and essential involvement of infinity.
In this regard, it is worth recalling that Euclidean Geometry has for
more than two millennia - that is, until Bolyai and Lobachevski in-
troduced in the early 1800s non-Euclidean Geometry - been also trou-
bled by infinity. Indeed, Euclid, with so many others after him, firmly
believed that postulates, or what we call nowadays by the name of
axiomxs, must be self-evident, this being the only basis for their ac-
ceptance. However, his Fifth Postulate on parallel lines was not only
clearly more complex in its formulation than the other postulates, but
on top of that, it was also the only one which involved infinity, and as
such, it was not within the realms of direct empirical verification.
The effect was that for more than two millennia, it got singled out as
being less self-evident than the other postulates. And as a result, the
general attitude has been to question its status of being a postulate.
What happened, however, was that such a questioning could for long
only make those involved aware of one single logical option. Namely,
if the fifth postulate was not in fact a postulate, then it had to be
a consequence of the other postulates, therefore, it could be proved
based on the other postulates.
As we know, such an approach proved to be wrong, and a second
logical possibility turned out to exist, namely that the fifth postulate
was actually independent of the other ones. And then, one could build
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a Geometry in which the negation of the fifth postulate would hold,
together with the other axioms of Euclidean Geometry.
Bolyai and Lobachevski chose one of the two possible negations, namely
that there are many different parallel lines to a given line which pass
through a point outside of that line.
Now, in Probability Theory infinity appears also inevitably, and does
so in several not unrelated ways. Here, for the sake of brevity, we
mention two of them. Further details can be found in [1].
An important feature of both of these approaches is that they consider
probability as being ontological, and not merely epistemic. Or in other
words, they consider probability to exist as a reality in the world, and
not only as a construct in our mind.
The frequency based view of probability is indeed most natural in case
of a finite number of possible events. However, when attempted to
extrapolate it to an infinite number of events, one faces difficulties
which in their foundational aspects are not unlike those faced with
the Fifth Postulate of Euclidean Geometry.
The propensity based view of probability seems also rather natural,
even if somewhat more involved and subtle than the frequency based
one. And similarly, it involves infinity inevitably and in an essential
way.
In view of the above, what may indeed turn out - regardless of anything
else - to be simply amusing about the Copenhagen Interpretation is
the apparent total lack of awareness of its proponents and supporters
of the fact that they are inevitably involving themselves in dealing
with infinity, and doing so in ways Physics, or for that matter, physi-
cists have never done it before.
Indeed, in all other branches of Physics, infinity only appears as a
possible quantity of one or another of the physical entities. And the
definition of such entities does not at all involve infinity. Also, empir-
ically one can deal with such entities without having to get involved
with infinity, except for special cases which are outside of by far most
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of the usual encounters with Physics, be they theoretical, experimen-
tal, or applicative.
On the other hand, according to the Copenhagen Interpretation, which
sees probability as ontological in the realms of quanta, the inevitable
and essential involvement of infinity is there, as mentioned above, and
it is there in completely new - yet consciously hardy known - ways in
Physics ...
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